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NOTES AND COMMENT
period of one to four years sorely needs an opportunity to refurbish
his rusty skills and should be assured that for one year he need not
compete in the labor market with those who may have become more
proficient in the course of these years. It is, however, significant to
note that due to an omission by the legislature to account for World
War I veterans, and their widows and dependents, these too can be
supplanted by a veteran of World War II. Simple legislation can
remedy such defect.
SAUL STEPHAN DAVIS.
VARYING ELEMENTS OF CONSPIRACY UNDER FEDERAL LAW
Two recent cases, in the Federal District Court for the District
of New Jersey were prosecutions for conspiracy. One was for con-
spiracy in restraint of trade,' the second for conspiracy to violate a
regulation or order of the Emergency Price Control Act.2 In one,
the court dealt with the question of reentry into a conspiracy, in the
other, whether conspiracy is a crime apart from the Act sought to
be violated or a crime under such Act. Both cases show that con-
spiracy is not a well defined crime, the essentials of which are uni-
form, but rather one in which they vary somewhat with each charge.
In United States v. National Wholesale Druggists' Associationo3
the corporate defendant had participated in agreements for price
schedules which allegedly constituted a conspiracy in restraint of
trade. The corporation later filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy.
From December 8, 1938 until July 1, 1941, the corporation was in
the custody and control of the court, whose trustee was in exclusive
possession and management. During this time the corporate officers
remained the same but under the control of the court. Throughout
this period the purchase and sale of drug products were continued
at prices in accord with the schedules established under the agree-
ment or alleged conspiracy. On July 1, 1941 the trusteeship was
terminated and the original officers of the defendant corporation were
reinstated. The question was whether upon resumption of legal
control of the business and assets of the defendant corporation by
the same officers and agents, their compliance with the prices previ-
ously established constituted a reentry into the conspiracy.
'United States v. National Wholesale Druggists Association, 61 F. Supp.
590 (D. C. N. J. 1945).2United States v. Schenley Distillers Corporation, 61 F. Supp. 601 (D. C.
N. J. 1945).
3United States v. National Wholesale Druggists Association, 61 F. Supp.
590 (D. C. N. J. 1945), cited supra note 1. %
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The court held that the defendant reentered a conspiracy, indi-
cated that the trustee could not be held for conspiracy and passed
the question whether identity of officers would be necessary in every
case to constitute reentry into a conspiracy.
Tracing and analyzing the conspiracy we can agree with the
court on the question of the defendant's guilt but would hold that
the court should also find the trustee a participant in the conspiracy,
and that identity though not necessary to hold the defendant for
conspiracy might be necessary if the charge were to be limited to
reentry into a conspiracy.
The conspiracy consisted of fixing a schedule of prices in viola-
tion of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The plan contemplated would
naturally require each conspirator after adoption to adhere to the
schedule. The conspiracy, therefore, had two aspects: forming the
schedule, and continuing to maintain the schedule. This was a single
continuing conspiracy. "When the plot contemplates bringing to
pass a continuous result that will not continue without the continuous
cooperation of the conspirators to keep it up, and there is such con-
tinuous cooperation it is a perversion of natural thought and of nat-
ural language to call such continuous cooperation a cinematographic
series of distinct conspiracies rather than to call it a single one." 4
Thus, up until December 8, 1938, the defendant was engaged in a con-
tinuing conspiracy.
The next two periods of control, that of the trustee and later
the defendant again, cause difficulty in tracing the conspiracy. The
court held that the trustee's action in adhering to the price schedule
was not a continuance of participation in the conspiracy theretofore
existing, and that when the defendant resumed control its practices
could not be considered merely as a continuation of the practices
established by the trustee. It held these acts of the defendant to be
the result of deliberate choice and that adherence to the schedules
already established was to be deemed a resumption of their original
attitude.
It is true that each of the three periods of control were separate
and distinct and that no act or intent of one group carried over to
another. It is also true that during the period of trusteeship there
was no legal capacity in the defendant to engage in the conspiracy.
The defendant was then not in control, so the conspiracy, as to him,
ended. What happened to the conspiracy in the interim, during
which time all the policies of the conspiracy were adhered to vol-
untarily? It has been held that, "where numerous competitors fixed
the prices they agree to maintain and another competitor not a party
to the agreement originally adopts the schedule and makes his prices
agree to the last penny, as the petitioners did with the prices which
the competitors fixed and charged, he cannot avoid responsibility
even though he be less active in the first instance or because his sub-
4 United States v. Kissel, 218 U. S. 601, 54 L. ed. 1168 (1910).
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sequent action was without affirmative, express agreement on his
part to maintain the prices fixed by others." 5 The trustee had to
make a choice of adopting the price schedule in being or make a
different one. He adopted the schedule the making of which con-
stituted one aspect of the conspiracy. The adoption was tantamount
to being present at the making of the schedule and by enforcing the
agreement the trustee participated in the second aspect of the
conspiracy.
By like method the defendant, if the officers were not identical
on the second occasion, would be a participant in the conspiracy.
It follows then that where a continuing conspiracy has been
found, if one member withdraws and another as his successor con-
tinues, the new member is chargeable as a conspirator and the sub-
sequent renewal of activity by the member who previously withdrew
constitutes a reentry by him into the conspiracy.
In this case it is to be noted that no mention of intent or overt
act in furtherance of the conspiracy is made. At common law the
crime of conspiracy was complete when one had agreed with others
either to do an unlawful act or a lawful act in an unlawful manner.
However, many courts have repeatedly held that the crime of con-
spiracy under the United States Code 6 was complete only when there
was an overt act by some member of the conspiracy which act was
in furtherance of the conspiracy and that the common law rule does
not apply.7
The Sherman Act itself provides that "every contract, com-
bination .. .or conspiracy in restraint of trade" 8 violates the Act.
In an indictment under the Sherman Act it is not necessary to allege
in detail the evidence of the conspiracy and the conspiracy need not
be described with the same degree of particularity required in de-
scribing a substantive offense. Nor is it necessary that an indict-
ment under the Sherman Act allege overt acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy charged. 9  This is one of the differences between con-
spiracy as a separate crime and conspiracy as a violation of the
Sherman Act.
In the Schenley Distillers Corporation 10 case, the corporation
and others were indicted for conspiracy to commit offenses against
5 Eugene Dietzgen and Co. v. Fed. Trade Commission, 142 F. (2d) 321
(C. C. A. 7th, 1944); Minnisohn v. United States, 101 F. (2d) 477 (C. C. A.
3d, 1939); United States v. Wilson, 23 F. (2d) 112 (N. D. W. Va. 1927).
635 STAT. 1096 (1909), 18 U. S. C. A. 88 (1940).7 United States v. Goldstein, 135 F. (2d) 359 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943) ; Hamner
v. United States, 134 F. (2d) 592 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943); Smith v. United
States, 92 F. (2d) 460 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) ; Billingsley v. United States, 249
Fed. 331 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918).826 STAT. 209, 210 (1890), 15 U. S. C. A. 1-7 (1890).
9 Mercer v. United States, 61 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 3d, 1932); United
States v. Waltham Watch, 47 F. Supp. 524 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
10 United States v. Schenley Distillers Corporation, 61 F. Supp. 601 (D. C.
N. J. 1945), cited supra note 2.
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the United States. The F. and A. Distributing Company applied
for leave to file a complaint in the Emergency Court of Appeals
against the Administrator of the Office of Price Administration set-
ting forth objections to the validity of the regulations as the Emer-
gency Price Control Act provided. The court denied the application
on the ground that the right to file a complaint was limited to those
who had been involved in criminal proceedings for violation of the
Act itself and does not include proceedings involving criminal con-
spiracy even when the conspiracy was directed toward violation of
the Emergency Price Control Act. The court held that this charge
was not a charge under the Act.
Other cases have held also that a charge of conspiracy is a
charge separate and apart from the provision toward which the con-
spiracy was directed. In United States v. Rabinowich," a conspiracy
to violate the Bankruptcy Act, the court held that the defendant
could not avail himself of the Statute of Limitations prescribed by
the Bankruptcy Act. In United States v. Hirsch 2 the defendant
was allowed to take advantage of the Statute of Limitations of con-
spiracy and did not come under the longer period provided for under
the revenue laws which he conspired to violate. After this case the
revenue laws were amended to provide that any offense arising under
the conspiracy statute should have a six-year period of limitation.
In Braverman v. United States,18 a later case, and also an indictment
for conspiring to violate the revenue laws, the court held that the
crime of conspiracy does not fall under the law violated; it constitutes
a separate crime. Nevertheless, the period of limitation as set forth
in the revenue laws was applied.
It would appear that no reference to the law which is the object
of the conspiracy should be allowed other than whether the conspiracy
was to violate that law. The punishment is governed by the crim-
inal code; the same should apply to the Statute of Limitations. From
the standpoint of social welfare this departure from strict adherence
may be very valuable and when this is true, logical construction should
not supersede social welfare. However, strict construction should not
be the rule only when it favors the prosecution.
In the Schenley case the defendant would find it exceedingly
difficult to determine whether he was doing an unlawful act. The
framers of the Emergency Price Control Act evidently had some
doubts about its validity when they inserted the clause providing for
a challenge. The court has not allowed the defendant to take ad-
vantage of that clause. To test its constitutional validity independent
of that provision, the defendant would have to show that he was in-
jured by the operation of the statute.14 Again he would be met with
"United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U. S. 78, 59 L. ed. 1211 (1915).
12 United States v. Hirsch, 100 U. S. 33, 25 L. ed. 539 (1879).
13 Braverman v. United States, 317 U. S. 49, 87 L. ed. 23 (1942).
1 4 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 80 L. ed. 688(1936).
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the obstacle that he was not accused under the statute of the Price
Control Act. Here is a vicious circle. A law which might be
flagrantly unconstitutional could be in effect indefinitely without
challenge.
Our law of conspiracy needs clarification, not to permit offenders
to avoid entrapment, but to allow each alleged transgressor to know
definitely that he will not be convicted for doing a lawful act in a
lawful manner and to prevent the exceptions from becoming so
numerous that they-completely overwhelm the original Section 37 of
the Criminal Code.
KATHARINE CURNEN MULLEN.
COMPETENCY OF CHILDREN AS WITNESSES; SIGNIFICANCE OF
OATHS TO CHILDREN
In New York, no unsworn testimony is admissible on the trial
of either a civil or a criminal case, except in one instance. The ex-
ception is to be found in Section 392 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure: '
The rules of evidence in civil cases are applicable also to criminal cases
except as otherwise provided in this code. Whenever in any criminal pro-
ceedings a child actually or apparently under the age of twelve offered as a
witness does not in the opinion of the court or magistrate understand the
nature of an oath, the evidence of such child may be received though not given
under oath if, in the opinion of the court or magistrate, such child is possessed
of sufficient intelligence to justify the reception of the evidence. But no
person shall be held or convicted of an offense upon such testimony unsupported
by other evidence.
The unsworn testimony of an infant is inadmissible in a civil
action 2 (unless waived by both parties), and that leads to our first
query, "At what age is an infant competent to testify under oath?"
Whereas, in a criminal jurisdiction, if a witness is over twelve, the
law presumes capacity; in civil jurisdiction there is no definite rule
as to the age at which an infant is competent to testify under oath.
The test is an individual one. In one case, it was held no error to
admit sworn testimony of a boy five years old; this on the ground
of the capacity and intelligence of the child, his appreciation of the
difference between truth and falsehood, as well as his duty to tell
the truth.3 A witness, six and a half years old, who knew she would
1 As amended by Chapter 279 of the Laws of 1892.2 Gehl v. Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co., 156 App. Div. 51, 141 N. Y.
Supp. 133 (1913); Arico v. New York Central 1. R., 240 App. Div. 721, 265
N. Y. Supp. 503 (1933).
3 Wheeler v. United States, 159 U. S. 523, 40 L. ed. 244 (1895).
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